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Abstract
The division of the Confessions into an autobiographi-
cal part (book 1-10) and an exegetical part to Gen. 1-2: 3 
(book 11-13) has raised questions with respect to their 
unity. While the view that the Confessions cannot be 
regarded as a unitary whole is now considered as a 
marginal position, there are various approaches to an 
integrating interpretation. This contribution elabo-
rates on the proposal that the unity of the Confessions 
arises from their interpretation as a narrative identity 
construction of Augustine. The underlying meta-nar-
rative in the Confessions is Augustine’s own doctrine 
of grace and original sin, which he has worked out 
in Simpl., 1, 2, shortly before. In the Confessions, Au-
gustine illustrates the effect of divine grace and the 
transformation of man from homo sub lege and homo 
sub gratia to homo in pace exemplarily on the basis of 
his own life story. This understanding is supported by 
the further thesis that Augustine himself deals exten-
sively with the question of “personal identity” in the 
Confessions and perceives identity in the context of 
neoplatonic conceptions as an inner-soul unity and 
harmony, which he conceives as unitas, quies/requies, 
and pax. The source of this unity is the eternal, un-
changing one God. In Augustine, pax also stands for 
the condition of spiritual balance and represents the 
Christianized version of epicurean ataraxia and sto-
ic tranquillitas animi. In addition, the contribution 
shows the systematic interlinkage of the Augustinian 
concepts of pax, unitas, caritas, requies, beatitudo, uti-
frui, res mutabiles-res immutabiles, creatio-creatura, 
temporalia-aeterna, and peregrinatio. 
Keywords: Confessions, harmony, mutability, peace, 
personal identity, self.
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Resumen
La división de las Confesiones en una parte autobiográ-
fica (libro 1-10) y una parte exegética de Gen. 1-2,3 (libro 
11-13) ha suscitado preguntas con respecto a su unidad. 
Si bien la opinión de que las Confesiones no pueden con-
siderarse como un todo unitario, ahora se considera una 
posición marginal, pues existen varios enfoques para 
una interpretación integradora. Esta contribución pro-
fundiza en la propuesta de que la unidad de las Confesio-
nes surge de su interpretación como una construcción 
de identidad narrativa de san Agustín. La meta-narrati-
va subyacente en las Confesiones es la propia doctrina 
de la gracia y el pecado original de san Agustín, que él 
desarrolla un poco antes en Simpl., 1, 2. En las Confe-
siones, san Agustín ilustra el efecto de la gracia divina y 
la transformación del hombre de homo sub lege y homo 
sub gratia a homo in pace de forma ejemplar, lo anterior 
sobre la base de la historia de su vida. Esta compren-
sión se apoya en la tesis adicional de que san Agustín 
trata ampliamente la cuestión de la “identidad personal” 
en las Confesiones y percibe la identidad en el contexto 
de las concepciones neoplatónicas como una unidad y 
armonía del alma interior, que él concibe como unitas, 
quies/requies, y pax. La fuente de esta unidad es el Dios 
eterno e inmutable. En Agustín pax también representa 
la condición del equilibrio espiritual y la versión cristia-
nizada de la ataraxia epicúrea y la tranquillitas animi es-
toica. Además, la contribución muestra la interconexión 
sistemática de los conceptos agustinianos de pax, uni-
tas, caritas, requies, beatitudo, uti-frui, res mutabiles-res 
immutabiles, creatio-creatura, temporalia-aeterna y pe-
regrinatio. 
Palabras clave: Paz, identidad personal, uno mismo, con-
fesiones, armonía, mutabilidad.
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Introduction
The division of the Confessions into an autobiographical part (book 1-10) and 
an exegetical part to Gen. 1-2: 3 (book 11-13), which was noted by Augustine 
himself (retract., 2, 6, 1), has raised questions with respect to their unity. While 
the view that the Confessions cannot be regarded as a unitary whole is now 
seen as a marginal position, there are various approaches to an integrating in-
terpretation (Feldmann). The variety of interpretations ranges from attempts 
to prove the unity of the Confessions on the basis of formal, stylistic and mo-
tivic criteria (Knauer; Steidle “Augustins Confessiones”; “Gedanken”; Fuhrer 
107), to the interpretation as a theology of creation (Nygren) or as proof of 
God (Steur), as a contemplation of the development of salvation (Kusch), an 
anti-Donatist project (Wundt), or as a trinitarian analysis showing the obnubi-
lation of the image of God in human beings after the Fall and its restoration by 
grace (O’Donnell, 2005, pp. 65-86).
My contribution elaborates on a new proposal, which has the  advantage of 
being largely compatible with the above-mentioned interpretations. The unity 
of the Confessions arises from interpreting them as a narrative identity con-
struction of Augustine. According to the contemporary concept of narrative 
identity, personal identity as an answer to the question “Who am I?”1 is con-
structed by narrating the story of our life, and interpreting it with reference to 
philosophical, religious or other cultural meta-narratives, thus giving meaning 
and significance to it (Klessmann 148). The underlying meta-narrative in the 
Confessions is Augustine’s own doctrine of grace and original sin, which he 
worked out in Simpl., 1, 2, shortly before. In the Confessions, Augustine illus-
trates the effect of divine grace and the transformation of man from homo sub 
lege and homo sub gratia to homo in pace exemplarily with  reference to his 
own life story, and thus endows it with unity and  coherence.2 According to 
this interpretation, the memoria-analysis in conf., 10, as well as those of time 
in conf., 11, is reasonable, since man as a temporal being develops his identity in 
a chronological process, and changes and (re-)constructs it from memory. 
Insofar as man is creatura, and as such is related to the whole creation and to 
the creator himself, and because his individual identity must be formed based 
on the conditio humana, the embedding of Augustine’s identity construction 
1 In the philosophy of antiquity, personal identity is therefore addressed under the heading 
of “self-knowledge”. See Hager. 
2 For the interpretation of the four-stage doctrine as a salvation-historical as well as an in-
dividual-historical perspective see Drecoll 183.
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into his theology of creation (conf. 11-13) is meaningful. This understanding is 
supported by the further thesis that Augustine himself addresses explicitly the 
question of personal identity in the Confessions (10, 2, 2; 10, 37, 62).
The compatibility with widely accepted interpretations is particularly evi-
dent in the common understanding of the Confessions as a confession of guilt, 
praise and faith; as part of the narrative elaboration of his identity—based on 
the meta-narrative of his teachings of grace and original sin—Augustine con-
fesses both his culpable affiliation with the children of Adam and his personal 
sins up to the time of the composition of the Confessions (confessio peccati), 
and the testimony of God’s graceful attention which he demonstrates exem-
plarily by his own life also shows features of a confessio laudis as well as that 
of a confessio fidei. In addition, the reference to  meta-narratives which is im-
plied in the concept of personal identity can be based on interpretations of the 
Confessions as autobiography (Misch, 1947); at the same time, it allows their 
extension to the specifically theological context of the work and its intention 
to turn the reader to God (conf., 10, 3, 4). Augustine’s concept of personal iden-
tity brings the topic of  peace (pax) into play. In accordance with the pagan 
philosophical  tradition of antiquity, Augustine discusses personal identity in 
a eudaimonistic context and understands it—following the Platonic as well as 
the Stoic tradition—as inner-psychic coherence, unity and harmony which 
is realized by virtue (Kiesel “Die Emotionstheorie“ 93f).3 This ideal constitu-
tion of the soul can be conceptualized as  “inner  peace.”4 However, unlike the 
schools of philosophy mentioned  above, Augustine believes after his turn to 
the theology of grace that, firstly, this virtuous perfection cannot be achieved 
in this life, secondly, that all moral progress is a gift of God’s grace, and thirdly, 
that perfect virtue as well as fulfilled inner peace can only be realized in eter-
nal blessedness (conf., 13).
A characteristic feature of the Augustinian concept of peace is the diversity 
of its fields of application (Atkins; Budzik). In addition to a social concept of 
peace, which is the prerequisite for a functioning communal life in any human 
3 See the Platonic analysis of the virtues as a harmonious unity of the three soul parts (lo-
gistikon, thymoeides and epithymêtikon) in Rep., IV, 441c-441a. See also  Seneca, ep. mor., 20, 
2, and Aristotle, NE, IX, 4, 1166a: “For [the spoudaios] is in agreement with himself, and he 
strives with all his soul for the same things.”
4 Pax stands in this sense for the state of mental balance and represents the Christianized 
version of the Epicurean ataraxia or the Stoic tranquillitas animi. While the Old Testament 
shalom is almost never used in the sense of “inner peace,”  there is a New Testament link 
between participation in the Christian community and  inner peace in Phil 4, 6-9. See Atkins 
567.
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community, Augustine discusses a closely related political concept of peace 
as an essential goal of earthly governance in domestic and external policy, as 
well as the peace of the Church founded by Christ (pax ecclesiae), and the 
 perfect heavenly peace (pax caelestis civitatis), which the members of the 
citizenship of God will enjoy in the coming kingdom of God. The common 
feature underlying all manifestations of peace is that of order (ordo).5 Order 
assembles various parts of an entity (living being, human, soul) or a commu-
nity harmoniously in a unity (unitas) and is defined by Augustine as “fair dis-
tribution of equal and unequal things” (civ., 19, 13).6 Augustine understands 
inner peace as “peace of a rational soul in the ordered accordance of thought 
and action”, as well as “peace between body and soul in the ordered and be-
lieving obedience to eternal law” (civ., 19, 13). In the eighth book of the Con-
fessions, Augustine discusses this concept of inner peace in more detail and 
analyses it as a harmonious unity of strivings (voluntates), emotions (affectus) 
and  deliberate decisions (liberum arbitrium) of a person, which are intercon-
nected by their shared orientation to the divine order of values (lex aeterna). 
It is at this point that the relation of the  Augustinian definition of inner peace 
to personal identity becomes clear. This connection is already etymologi-
cally obvious in the term identity. It comes from the Latin idem, “the same”. 
 According to Augustine, to be “the same” in all respects is syno nymous with 
the shared axiological orientation of all mental aspirations and phenomena to 
the lex aeterna, and where there is this kind of inner-soul “sameness”, there 
is also inner peace. The theoretically conceivable accordance of all relevant 
mental conditions in the sense of a shared orientation towards evil (malum), 
on the other hand, is for Augustine in many respects neither an expression 
of order, unity, tranquillity or peace, nor does it realize the genuine identi-
ty of a person. A human soul that does not follow the divine order of values 
misses its destiny as a creature of God (creatura). It falls into an ontological 
and ethical state of disorder and gets into a state of strife and disturbed unity 
with God and fellow human beings as well as with himself: “That is why the 
unholy, who have no peace due to their unholiness, are lacking the peaceful 
order in which there is no disturbance” (civ., 19, 13). Since the orientation to-
ward sin ultimately leads to eternal damnation, it is also self-destructive, so 
that there is also in a final sense a lack of peace in the realm of the self. For 
the same reasons, the sinner cannot succeed in a peaceful construction of 
5 For the concept of ordo in Augustine, see Enders.
6 Translations that are not listed in the bibliography are mine. Regarding the Confessions, I 
have always consulted the excellent German translation by Flasch and Mojsisch together 
with the English translation by Hammond. 
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 personal identity.7 According to the essentialist position of Augustine, the in-
dividual must answer the question “Who am I?”, based on her or his  essential 
nature as a human being and thus as a creature of God. The person who sins 
out of conviction gives a wrong answer to the question “Who am I?,” and miss-
es her or his identity as creatura directed toward the Creator. In this sense, 
the Augustinian concept of personal identity must be understood in a norma-
tive way.
The fact that the concept of inner peace in the context of Augustine’s nar-
rative identity construction in the Confessions plays a major role, is evident 
from the frequency of relevant terms. The term pax is found 20 times—the 
associated adjective pacificus three times—, and thus corresponds numerical-
ly to the occurrences of confessio (23 times). Given the contextual overlap, it 
is not surprising that related terms, including quies, are also found 23 times 
(Lawless 45). As the following reflections shall show, Augustine uses the terms 
pax, ordo, unitas, and (re-)quies in the context of the systematic connections 
of inner peace and personal identity almost synonymous (Atkins 568).
Inner Peace and Personal Identity in the Confessions
Confessions I
The famous first passage in conf., 1, 1, 1, “our hearts are restless until they rest in 
you (inquietum est cor nostrum, donec  resquiescat in te),” shows that the ques-
tion of peace of mind and personal identity in the sense of a harmonious unity 
of the self is one  basic theme of the Confessions. The source of restful peace 
is the triune God, and the longed-for peace will only be fulfilled in the “Sab-
bath of eternal life” (conf., 13, 36, 51), as Augustine will explain in the course of 
the other books. The formal framework of the longing for peaceful rest at the 
beginning and the description of the fulfilment of this yearning at the end of 
the work, points to the substantial insight that the existence of man originates 
from the creator and strives back to him: “For you have made us toward your-
self (quia fecisti nos ad te)”8 (conf., 1, 1, 1). Augustine conceptualizes this return 
to origin as peregrinatio,9 as a rocky path in the foreign land, and a restless as 
7 On the connection between the sinless soul and a peaceful self-constitution see the litur-
gical Agnus Dei: “…Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi, dona nobis pacem.”
8 My translation. Hammond reads: “for you have made us for yourself.”
9 See Ps. 149: 5 and the implicit reference to the parable of the lost son (Lk. 15: 11-32) in conf., 
1, 18, 28. For further reading see Stewart-Kroeker.
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well as a peaceless enterprise. Augustine’s question, whether it is more precise 
to say that he would not exist, if God were not in him, or he exists only because 
he is in God (conf., 1, 2, 2), shows that man’s profound submission to God can 
be described only in paradoxes. But it is not only his creatureliness that refers 
man completely to God. God, as a punishment for the Fall, struck all children 
of Adams with ignorance of the good (ignorantia) and moral weakness (diffi-
cultas) (lib. arb., 3, 18, 52), and changed human nature to such an extent that he 
ceases to be capable of a sinless life (non posse non  peccare), the rescue out of 
this misery requires the intervention of divine grace. By himself, man is only 
free to sin, to which he is driven by the overwhelming sinful desire (concupis-
centia) as the source of his restless strife.10 In this sense, man is only “a part of 
your creation... [that] bears everywhere its own mortality, …the evidence of its 
own sin” (conf., 1, 1, 1). The almost complete moral depravity can only be healed 
by the perfectly good God. Between the good and just God and the sinful and 
corrupt man a gap opens up whose overcoming in the act of grace evokes 
the praise of God: “Great are you, O Lord, and surpassingly worthy of praise 
(laudabilis  valde)” (conf., 1, 1, 1). Augustine makes it clear that this praise of God 
is also a gift of grace (“You inspire us [excitas] to take delight in praising you” 
(conf., 1, 1, 1), in this way packaging his recently elaborated doctrine of grace in 
the confessio laudis of the first passage of the work. In addition to this enor-
mous ethical hiatus, Augustine also emphasizes the ontological gap between 
the restlessness of man and the tranquillity of God; while man as creatura ex-
ists in space and time and is subject to physical as well as psychic changes, the 
timeless eternity of God ensures his everlasting active rest: “Semper agens, 
semper quietus” (conf., 1, 4, 4). This, too, is an insight that can only be formu-
lated by the limited perspective of man in the form of a paradox. In contrast to 
God, the changeable human being is inevitably subject to a  diachronic change 
in his or her identity and finds ontological survival in the realm of immutabili-
ty: “You bind us together [conligis nos]” (conf., 1, 3, 3). The  underlying Neopla-
tonic motive of dispersing man,11 who is trapped in changeability and turning 
towards the  temporal, is illustrated by Augustine’s metaphorical self-charac-
terisation as “earth and ashes” (conf., 1, 6, 7).
The radical being of man in relationship to God also becomes apparent in 
another point. Although Augustine undoubtedly has his  readers in mind 
10 On the Fall as the cause of mental strife see Iul., 3, 23, 2: “For there should be peace in the 
interior of man before sin, not war”; and 5, 24, 4: “In the whole soul and in the whole body I 
have the creator as the God of peace, who sowed the struggle in me?” 
11 On the thought of dispersion into multiplicity see Plotinus enn., VI, 4, 7.
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when writing the Confessions (conf., 10, 3, 3), he considers his work as a dia-
logue with God, whose gracious  attention makes him a worthy subject of his 
deliberations. For this  reason, Augustine begins his life story with a hymn to 
God (conf., 1, 1-5, 6) and indicates through numerous direct addresses in the 
thirteen books that he sees the Confessions as a dialogue with the Creator. 
Therefore, the theoretical insight of man’s  focus on God is designed by Au-
gustine in the Confessions as a performative act.
Following the proem, Augustine begins with the narrative of his life, which 
he formally divides into the previously completed four of the seven stages of 
life according to the Roman counting. The reconstruction of his infanthood 
(conf., 1, 6, 7-7, 12) is characterized by his meta-narratives of original sin and 
grace as well as by the dichotomy between the greatness of the Creator and 
the weakness of man, both ontological and moral. Augustine now concretizes 
the general realization that man is grounded in God with reference to his own 
person, hereby making it the basic truth of his own formation of identity. 
In this context, too, it becomes clear that Augustine, within his  biographical 
narrative, makes the topic of “personal identity” an  explicit subject of theoret-
ical reflections: “My infancy is long ago, dead: and I am alive” (conf., 1, 6, 9); and 
“What was before that [i.e.  before my birth, D. K.], my sweetness, my God? Did 
I exist somewhere? Was I someone at all?” (conf., 1, 6, 9). Also, the transition 
from infantia to pueritia in conf. 1, 8, 13-20, 31, is an example of man’s fluid 
and elusive identity: “Was it really I who went onward from infancy and pro-
gressed to boyhood? Or was it rather that boyhood entered into me and took 
the place of my infancy? Infancy did not  leave me–for where did it go to? Yet it 
was no longer there” (conf., 1, 8, 13).12 (This becoming of the creatures contrasts 
Augustine with the timeless being of God: “And still you yourself remain the 
same (idem ipse)”, conf., 1, 6, 10). As idem ipse and “the most high [summus… es]” 
(conf., 1, 6, 10), God is the ideal of identity in the sense of selfsameness and uni-
ty. All finite forms of physical and mental “wholeness (incolumitatem)” (conf., 1, 
20, 31) have their origins in this “mystical unity (secretissimae unitatis) of yours 
from which my existence derived” (conf., 1, 20, 31).
Beyond the gift of life, God is also the donor of all natural goods of living be-
ings, of those who are in their species-specific nature, such as the life-sus-
taining “instincts” (conatus) (conf., 1, 7, 12), as well as of those given to him 
12 This consideration is a reference to the analysis of time in book 11 and the volatility of the 
three tempora.
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from the outside: “But neither my mother nor those who nursed me filled their 
own breasts with milk. You were the one who used to give me nourishment 
through them” (conf., 1, 6, 7). The moral condition of the underage baby—little 
Augustine claims no more than what is necessary for him—is just as much as 
the willingness of responsible caregivers to attend for the child a gift of God 
(dabas) (conf., 1, 6, 7), while the sin of which no one is free must be attributed 
to man himself (conf., 1, 7, 11). Augustine’s theology of grace shows here as well 
as his teaching of original sin: “But if I was also conceived in wickedness [in 
iniquitate], and in sin [in peccatis] my mother nourished me in the womb…” 
(conf., 1, 7, 12).
Relevant for the present question is the connection between the sin, which 
is caused by man, and the spiritual strife caused by it, which Augustine al-
ready states in the context of his boyhood narrative. The  train of thought is 
the following: in a well-ordered creation, the existence of sin is in need of 
explanation because it seems to conflict with the idea of a perfectly good 
God. Augustine seeks a solution to the problem by differentiating between 
God-given natural phenomena, and the sin brought into the world by man. 
Both the natural world and the sin are integrated by God in an all-em-
bracing ordo: “And though you are both disposer and creator of all natu-
ral phenomena, of sins you are the disposer only” (conf., 1, 10, 16). The di-
vine lex aeterna not only determines the ordo of all things hierarchically, 
but at the same time it enacts the punishment of the sinner. By perverting 
the order of things, the sinner also perverts his own nature, upsetting his 
soul, and is consequently punished with unrest and peacelessness: “For this 
is your decree… that every disordered (inordinatus) mind becomes its own 
punishment” (conf., 1, 12, 19). Man finds inner peace and spiritual unity only 
by turning toward God, the highest unity, while the sinful boy Augustine 
“was carried away into vain pursuits” because he “went outside [ibam foras] 
(conf., 1, 18, 28).13 
The attention to these lesser goods (academic or sporting success, enjoyment 
of games instead of learning) is punished by aversive affects associated with 
them. Augustine notes “fear of disgrace and beatings” (conf., 1, 17, 27), “fear [of] 
grammatical solecisms”, “envy” (conf., 1, 19, 30), and, more generally, “distress, 
disorder, delusion [dolores, confusiones, errores]” (conf., 1, 20, 31).
13 My translation.
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Confessions II
In the second book, in which Augustine reports on the aberrations of his youth 
(adulescentia), the dichotomy of rest in God on the one hand, and the peace-
less disposition as well as the mental fragmentation of the slaves of sin, are 
prominently featured. Augustine begins his remarks with the call to God: “For 
you are… a sweetness which brings happiness and peace [secura], pulling me 
back together from the disintegration [et conligens me a dispersione] in which 
I was being shattered and torn apart [discissus sum], when I turned away from 
you who are unity and dispersed into the multiplicity that is oblivion” (conf., 2, 
1, 1)14 and finishes them in the same way: “With you there is deep peace [quies] 
and life which cannot be disturbed [vita imperturbabilis]. …in my teens I was 
too inconstant in your steadfastness [stabilitate]; and I made myself a barren 
land” (conf., 2, 10, 18).
The youthful sins reported by Augustine are unspecified sexual debauchery 
and the famous pear theft. Using the example of sexual desire (which is not 
ordered in the legitimate paths of marriage and the procreation of offspring), 
the paradigm of sinful desire and generic term for all kinds of misguided de-
sire (concupiscentia), he demonstrates the difference between love for God 
and the neighbour (“the purity of love [serenitas dilectionis]” (conf., 2, 2, 2), 
and the “darkness of lust [caligine libidinis]” (conf., 2, 2, 2) or perverted love 
that “turns away from you and looks away from you for what is untainted and 
pure, but cannot find it except by returning to you” (conf., 2, 6, 14). This dis-
tinction is relevant in several ways. On the one hand, the difference between 
pious love of God and neighbour and sinful desire, the primary object of which 
are external, physical or specific spiritual goods (intelligence, good memo-
ry, quick comprehension, etc.), coincides with the distinction between virtue 
and vice (Kiesel “Voluntas, amor”). Augustine extends the ancient catalogue 
of virtues with the three Pauline virtues of faith, love, hope (1 Cor. 13: 13), and 
understands with Paul the rightly guided love (agapê, caritas) as the epitome 
of virtue. Accordingly, he summarizes his ethics with the imperative “Love and 
do what you will [dilige, et quod vis fac]” (Io. ep. tr., 7, 8). This love is determined 
by the orientation toward the hierarchical divine order of goods, whereby love 
itself takes the form of an ordered love (ordo amoris) (Bodei, 1993). In book II, 
Augustine mentions sensually tangible beautiful objects, honour, power, life, 
and friendship among others as examples of low-ranking goods with a certain 
14 See conf., 6, 14.
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“dignity [decus]” (conf., 2, 5, 10), and emphasizes their subordination to “God, 
and your truth and your law” (conf., 2, 5, 10).
The connection of right love and virtue or of misguided love and vice also lies 
in the Augustinian interpretation of the pear theft he committed as a teen-
ager together with his friends. While certain attitudes which are believed to 
be virtues (according to worldly conventions), are in truth vices (sovereignty 
is arrogance, false love is lust, pretended zeal is mere curiosity) because they 
strife for temporal goods and not for the eternal God as the epitome of hon-
our, true love and highest knowledge, the pear theft is a paradigm for the rad-
ical perversion of divine law and a “versuchte Umkehrung des Verhältnisses 
von Schöpfer und Geschöpf” (Brachtendorf “Augustins Confessiones” 68). As 
is well known, the intention of the theft is not to eat the juicy fruits (Augustine 
throws them away, conf., 2, 6, 12), but the joy of breaking the law itself. Thus, it 
is at the same time the paradigm of a false attitude that misses the creaturely 
nature of human beings and results in a disturbed and unstable identity lead-
ing to self-destruction: “My soul was foul and, becoming alienated from your 
firm foundation, it was disintegrating into oblivion” (conf., 2, 4, 9).
Important for our topic is the connection between emotions and spiritual 
peace. According to the Stoic conception, the sage develops only so-called 
“good feelings” (eupatheiai or constantia) that do not cloud emotional well-be-
ing, but no excessive and peace-disturbing affects (pathê or perturbationes 
animi) (Halbig). By contrast, Augustine emphasizes that even Christians gift-
ed by the Holy Ghost with divine love (amor Dei, caritas) are not free from 
stressful emotions. As Augustine shows by using the example of his mother 
and her concern for the son’s salvation (conf., 3, 11, 9), even pious fears can 
be existentially threatening and severe. In addition, Augustine considers the 
Stoic conception of a fundamental human capacity to eradicate harmful and 
morally dubious emotions in this life to be illusory (civ., 9, 4). In this respect, 
homo sub gratia differs from homo in pace.
Significant, however, is the difference between aversive affects that evolve in 
the value context of a godly life and those that are grounded in an orienta-
tion toward lower-ranking goods. Indeed, the former also have their origin in 
the punishment of sin: Adam and Eve, before biting into the forbidden fruit, 
knew only joy (gaudium) and love (amor) (civ., 14, 10) and, moreover, were not 
yet submitted15 under original sin and its threatening deadly consequence, 
15 Accordingly, Augustine’s choice of words is clear when he speaks of his coming into 
“this life which is mortal—or is it perhaps life-giving death?” (conf., 1, 6, 7), as well as of the 
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 eternal damnation.16 Yet, pious fears are set within the divine order because 
they spring from the love of God and charity, while affections directed to in-
ferior goods turn this order upside down. Thus, while God looks upon the for-
mer with pleasure and shows willingness to comfort and answer the prayers 
of the  burdened,17 the latter carry their punishment within themselves, as the 
aversive character of these emotions cause mental pain and peacelessness: 
“I transgressed all your true ordinances, but I did not escape your scourges” 
(conf., 2, 2, 4). In the context of his narrative identity construction against the 
background of the meta-narrative of his doctrine of grace, Augustine inter-
prets the inner peacelessness that causes painful affects not only as a pun-
ishment, but also as a remedy that should remind the youthful sinner of the 
ungodliness of his doings:
After all, you were always there…, sprinkling all my forbidden  pleasures with 
the bitterest of disappointments, so that I would seek a kind of pleasure that 
is free from disappointment, and when I did so I would find none other but 
yourself, Lord, yourself alone (conf., 2, 2, 4).
Confessions III
These motives continue in the third book, in which Augustine  reports on the 
period of his rhetoric studies in Carthage and his spiritual aberrations. The 
promising reading of Cicero’s protreptic script Hortensius, which gives him a 
first impulse to search for “immortal wisdom” (conf., 3, 4, 7), is followed by a dis-
appointing study of the Bible and the so motivated turn to Manichaeism. Augus-
tine relates how he did not bind his identity to the creator, who as the true one 
(unum) can also produce the peaceful inner unity of man, but to the world of ex-
ternal things as well as to sensual pleasure. The latter cuts through “that actual 
union that we ought to have with God” (conf., 3, 8, 15): “So my soul was in a poor 
state of health, and covered in sores [ulcerosa], it lay prostrate out of doors” 
(conf., 3, 1, 1). This attachment of the self to the outside world goes hand in hand 
with the false Manichaean image of God as well as with the alienation from the 
divine and the self: “I was wandering far from you. …I was seeking you not be 
following my mind’s understanding… but according to my capacity for physical 
 “pestilent odor (pestilentiosum)” (conf., 2, 3, 8) (my translation) of his father’s encourage-
ment to sex.
16 Since the Fall, humanity has formed a massa peccati (Simpl., 1, 2, 16).
17 Augustine demonstrates this with the example of his mother, who is comforted in her fears 
for Augustine’s salvation by the words of the bishop: “…it is impossible that the son of your 
tears should perish!” (conf., 3, 12, 21). See also 11, 19.
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sensation” (conf., 3, 6, 11). The inner emptiness that Augustine feels in himself and 
that could only have been filled with spiritual “incorruptible food” (conf., 3, 1, 1) 
cannot be filled with the Manichaean God, “but instead was utterly  drained” 
(conf., 3, 6, 10).
In the consequence, Augustine seeks solace in sensual passions. The false love 
that underlies his escapades is the cause of sorrowful afflictions, which Au-
gustine once again interprets as God’s discipline and means of correction:
My God, my mercy, how good you were, sprinkling that sweet gratification 
of mine with so much bitterness! …and I was happy to be constrained by 
burdensome bonds—with the result that I was being beaten with glowing 
iron rods of jealousy, mistrust, anxieties, rages and quarrelling (conf., 3, 1, 1). 
In this sense, the punishment for wrong love is inherent in this love itself,
Because when they sin against you, they also profane their own souls, and in-
iquity is self-deceiving whether in harming and perverting their nature, which 
you have created and set in its proper place (conf., 3, 8, 16). 
The mentioned connection between sin as the reversal of the divine ordo and 
the destruction of the peaceful order in man’s soul as its immediate conse-
quence is expressly described here, as is the dichotomy between love of God 
and neighbour and misguided love (conf., 3, 8, 15). The fact that Augustine con-
nects love of God and neighbour with the commandment of self-love fits in 
the framework of his presentation: whoever acts against God and his neigh-
bour harms first and foremost his own soul and its peace.
Confessions IV
At the heart of the fourth book are Augustine’s ethical- theological reflections 
on the early death of his childhood friend. Using the example of his young 
self’s emotional responses to the loss, Augustine analyses the devastating 
consequences a misguided love can have for the lover’s identity and peace 
of mind: “I had become the subject of my own questioning” (conf., 4,6,9). The 
systematic context is this: according to Augustine, the lover identifies with 
the object of his love and strives for union to complete the integration of the 
beloved into his own self. Hereby, the lover externalizes his identity through 
attachment to outside things as well as to persons (Kiesel, “Die Emotions-
theorie Augustins” 104-107). If love is directed to the eternal and unchanging 
God, the object of love is always available, and the unity and integrity of the 
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loving self are assured. Identification with changeable and perishable things 
(res  mutabiles), on the other hand, threatens the integrity of the self. Because 
the objects of love can be torn away by loss, robbery or death, the lover is 
always threatened by personal fragmentation, and in a state of inner peace-
lessness and unrest. Pain, fear, overflowing lust and insatiable desires are 
the emotional manifestations of this perverted love:
What is all love, if it does not want to become one with the beloved and em-
braces it in a way that it will be united with him? ...What makes pain what it 
is, if not the violent separation of once united things? Therefore, it is bitter 
and dangerous to become one with things that can be separated (ord., 2, 11, 8).
Augustine illustrates this phenomenon by the example of the love for his 
friend, whom he felt to be his “twin self [ille alter eram]” (conf., 4, 6, 11). With 
reference to Horace (Odes, 1, 3) and Ovid (Tristia, 4, 4, 72), Augustine describes 
the integration of the friend into his own identity: “How rightly someone once 
called his friend, ‘half of my own self [dimidium animae suae]’. For I felt that my 
soul and his were one soul in two bodies…” (conf., 4, 6, 11). The loss of the friend 
as part of his self thus destroys the integrity of the ego18 and causes emo-
tional confusion: “And that was why life was dreadful to me because I did not 
want to live as half a person” (conf., 4, 6, 11). Augustine finds no peace because 
the identification with himself is disturbed: “I was carrying about with me my 
shattered, bleeding soul; it could not endure being carried by me” (conf., 4, 7, 
12). This inner peacelessness motivates an unfulfillable desire for escaping his 
own self: “Where could I flee, to escape from myself?” (conf., 4, 7, 12). Augustine 
summarizes his personal experience of the mental turmoil that follows the 
death of such a loved one in a general  insight: “I was miserable, as every mind 
is miserable that is fettered by its love of earthly things yet torn into pieces 
[dilaniatur] when it is deprived of them” (conf., 4, 6, 11).
The negative assessment of friendship with mortals suggests a general pro-
hibition of affectionate interpersonal relationships and raises the question of 
whether this does not—against the  biblical testimony—nullify the command-
ment to love one’s  neighbour. Augustine seeks a solution to this problem by 
differentiating between two types of love for fellow human beings. The harm-
ful form of affection for the neighbour is not able, “to love humanity in a hu-
18 See also conf., 4, 8, 13: “For how else had that pain pierced me so easily and so deeply, if 
not because I had poured out my soul upon the sand by loving someone mortal as if they 
were immortal?”
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man way [diligere homines humaniter]”19 (conf., 4, 7, 12).20 To love people in this 
right way is to love them as creatures in the creator: “Only those who hold 
everyone dear, in the One who can never be lost, never lose anyone dear to 
them” (conf., 4, 9, 14).21 In particular, friendships as most intimate and intense 
relationships should be borne out of a Christian spirit: “Blessed are those who 
love you, and love their friend in you and their enemy because of you” (conf., 4, 
9, 14). Such interpersonal relationships are endowed by God and firmly united 
in the love of God as a gift of the Holy Spirit (conf., 4, 4, 7). This love also binds 
together and makes “from many [minds], one” (conf., 4, 8, 13). Unlike misguided 
love, however, it fits into the love of God and thus has a share in its stability 
(conf., 4, 9, 14): friends who are attached to each other in God will one day 
complete their love in the eternal unity of the community of the blessed.22 
Moreover, the imperishable love of God not only guarantees the inner peace 
of the lover, but also, through the common orientation toward the divine law, 
social peace among men.
This pious form of loving affection for a friend remains for the time being 
just as impossible for Augustine as the divine comfort: peace, tranquillity, and 
the healing of mental division and identity diffusion can only be granted by the 
eternal triune God as the source of all peaceful unity: “Stand with him, and 
you will stand fast indeed; take your rest in him and you will find peace” (conf., 
19 My translation.
20 See conf. 4, 8, 13.
21 See conf. 4, 12, 18.
22 This understanding of right and misguided love is systematically linked to the uti-frui 
distinction. See Mayer 65: “Zu den Prinzipien der in De doctrina christiana zusammenge-
fassten Hermeneutik gehört die mit Hilfe des ontologischen Schemas ‹mutabile-inmuta-
bile› vorgenommene Unterscheidung der Dinge (‹res›), in solche, die sich verändern, und 
in solche, die bleiben. Unter Hinzuziehung weiterer Schemata aus der Erkenntnislehre (Sig-
num-res) und der Ethik (Frui-uti) teilt A. die ‹res› auf in ‹significantes› und ‹significatae› 
sowie in ‹fruendae› und ‹utendae›. …Diese [Hermeneutik] hat nicht zuletzt die Klärung der 
mit dem ‹creator› identischen ‹aeterna atque incommutabilia› sowie der mit den ‹creatu-
rae› identischen ‹temporalia atque mutabilia› zum Ziel und steht zugleich im Dienste des 
Programmes ‹redire in patriam›.” See also Chadwick 72f; and Budzik 65. The interpretation 
by Dupont explains why the pious love of one’s neighbour guarantees, on the one hand, the 
longevity of the beloved and, on the other hand, why, in a certain sense, humans may also 
be enjoyed: “Only as far as the Lord is present in humans, are humans enjoyable (498).” See 
also the reading by Verheijen 180-182. Canning explains Verheijen’s view: “Human beings are 
also to be objects of frui in the proper sense of the term, but this is a heavenly not an earthly 
frui, and it is frui in deo because God alone, and not human beings, brings human life to full 
beatitude” (324).
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4, 12, 18).23 The Manichaean deity, to which Augustine continues to cling, as a 
“imaginary being” and “heretical belief” (conf., 4, 7, 12), on the other hand, can 
be no haven of peace and rest.
Confessions V
In the fifth book, Augustine describes his gradual estrangement from Man-
ichaeism and the ongoing turn toward Christianity. Decisive for the former is 
the disappointing encounter with the Manichaean bishop Faustus of Mileve in 
Carthage, who cannot scientifically substantiate and make plausible the cos-
mological myths of his faith (conf., 5, 6, 11-7, 13). The indiscipline of his students 
in Carthage leads Augustine on a career change to Rome, where he again gets 
into a Manichaean environment and, despite his doubts, continues to cling 
to the Manichaean conception of God and biblical criticism as well as to the 
substantiality of evil (conf., 5, 10, 18-21, 21). As the students in Rome also turn 
out to be refractory and unwilling to pay, he successfully applies for the posi-
tion of rhetorician at the Milan Imperial Court, where his acquaintance with 
the allegorical biblical exegesis of Bishop Ambrose shows him an intellectually 
satisfying way of dealing with Holy Scripture (conf., 5, 14, 24). A short phase 
of turning to academic scepticism is followed by the catechumenate in the 
Christian Church (catholica ecclesia) (conf., 5, 14, 25).
As in the previous books, Augustine explicitly addresses the  question of his 
personal identity in the context of his way of life in separation from God.24 
Because God cannot be found in the external material world, but only in the 
interior of man,25 the self-exodus of the young rhetorician goes hand in hand 
with the  unintended rejection of God: “So where was I, when I was search-
ing for you? You were right in front of me, but I had even abandoned myself, 
and I could not find myself, never mind you!” (conf., 5, 2, 2). Again, Augustine 
puts viciousness, remoteness of God, and peacelessness into one (“the wicked, 
those who are without rest”, conf., 5, 2, 2), and contextualizes this as part of 
his ordo-concept: “you [have] arranged all things so that they have magnitude, 
number and  weight (mensura et numero et pondero)” (conf., 5, 4, 7). He also sees 
the audacity of his students in Carthage as a disturbance of order (perturbant 
23 See conf., 4, 7, 12; 10, 15; 11, 16.
24 See conf., 5, 6, 10: “For almost nine years, in which my mind was aimless and  destitute, and 
I continued a ‘hearer’….”
25 On the connection between knowledge of the divine and the self, see sol. 1, 7: “I want to get 
to know God and the soul. Then nothing? No, nothing!” 
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ordinem, conf., 5, 8, 14), as well as the insolvent students in Rome whom he 
describes as “untrustworthy and [mentally, D. K.] crooked (pravos et distortos)” 
(conf., 5, 22, 22). While the teacher Augustine felt personally disturbed by this 
impudence of his disciples, the author of the Confessions desires their im-
provement “for your sake” (conf., 5, 22, 22), and defines this improvement as a 
recognition of the hierarchical order of goods: “If they come to prefer, instead 
of money, the true teaching that they master, and over that to prefer you, who 
are God” (conf., 5, 22, 22). The subordination of all goods under God, who is “of 
assured good [certi boni]” (conf., 5, 22, 22), would impart to them a stable self 
as well as “purest peace [pacem castissimam]” (conf., 5, 22, 22) in their souls as 
well as within their social environment.
The dichotomy between ordered and disordered love is also mentioned in the 
fifth book—this time exemplified by Augustine’s  mother Monica. The misguid-
ed and egocentric love for her son is demonstrated by her unwillingness to 
let Augustine go to Rome without maternal accompaniment, and Augustine 
characterizes it as “fleshly desire [carnale desiderium]” (conf., 5, 8, 15).26 The 
inner-soul peacelessness that results from this false love manifests itself in 
the emotional pain, which Augustine in this context, too, interprets as a divine 
chastisement and “righteous scourge of sorrows” (conf., 5, 8, 15). On the other 
hand, Monica’s concern for the salvation of her son springs from an upright 
love of God and neighbour. This love too is accompanied by restlessness: “…
how much more she struggled (sollicitudine) to give me spiritual birth then 
when she had given birth to me physically” (conf., 5, 9, 16). In contrast to the 
peacelessness of perverted love, the concern of pious love finds divine appre-
ciation and is rewarded with God’s answers to prayers: 
Would you have spurned this woman’s tears, not shed in pleading for… some 
fragile or changeable good, but for the salvation of her own son’s soul? Or 
driven her from your help though it was by your gift that she was what she 
was? (conf. 5, 9, 17).
Augustine uses the interpretive pattern of his theological meta-narrative at 
this point as well, attributing Monica’s sin to herself, but all the best in her 
personality to God. In addition, he emphasizes the providence of his fate by 
God, who did not let him die in  separation from him of a disease contracted in 
Rome: “though you did not allow me, such as I was, to endure a double death” 
(conf., 5, 9, 16).
26 My translation. Hammond reads: “the physical element of her attachment.”
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Confessions VI
The sixth book reports (including some side stories) on the  arrival of mother 
Monica in Milan and her contact with Bishop  Ambrose,  Augustine’s separation 
from his concubine, and subsequent  marriage plans. In spiritual terms, Augus-
tine is still in a state of upheaval: the abandonment of Manichaeism does not 
yet result in a definite turn toward Christianity, because Augustine continues 
to cling to a materialistic idea of God. 
Following the Socratic-Platonic self-understanding of philosophy as care of 
the soul (epimeleia tês psychês, Plato, Phd., 107c), Augustine reconstructs this 
phase of life as a “cross over from sickness to health” and considers it as “crit-
ical” (conf., 6, 1, 1).27 The  salvation of the soul, which Augustine sees as a peace-
ful  inner-soul unity, can only be found if man grasps his true identity as a 
creature of the one and spiritual God: Self- knowledge and knowledge of God 
are directly linked. Paradoxically, it is precisely the consciousness of this con-
nection that prevents Augustine from true knowledge of God. Believing that 
“you have made humanity in your image” (conf., 6, 3, 4), he seeks “this image of 
yours” (conf., 6 ,4, 5) not in the inner world of his mind but “restricted you on 
all sides to the configuration of human limbs” (conf., 6 ,4, 5). This false image of 
God is responsible for Augustine’s spiritual peacelessness, because it offers no 
safe place for his “storms of emotion” (conf., 6, 3, 4). The moral maladjustment 
of a perverted love orientation and his greed for “honours,  profits, marriage” 
(conf., 6, 6, 9), as well as his “disease of the flesh with all its deadly desirability” 
(conf., 6, 12, 21), have not yet been cured and are pushing on “the sickness of 
my soul” (conf., 6, 4, 6): “By so desiring, I endured the bitterest of struggles” 
(conf., 6, 6, 9).28
27 Augustine discusses Alypius’ addiction to the circus games in the context of the salvation 
of the soul (“At once he was struck by a wound to his soul that was  deeper (graviore vulnere) 
than the wound the combatant he was now eager to watch  suffered to his body” (conf., 6, 8, 
13), and parallelizes the successive effect of grace on Alypius with his own: “This, however, 
was being stored up in his memory as a medicine for him in the future [medicinam futuram] 
(conf., 6, 9, 14). Just as Monica’s warnings indicate the divine will, Augustine’s criticism of 
the games is in truth the work of God: “It was not I who had reproached him, though, but 
you” (conf., 6, 7, 12).
28 Augustine also sees this peaceless constitution of the soul as a lack of freedom when he 
describes himself as a “slave of lust” (conf., 6, 15, 25). Hereby, he refers to his emphatic con-
cept of freedom as freedom for good. See lib. arb., 1, 15, 109: There is “no true freedom except 
the freedom of the happy and those who are attached to the eternal law.” This idea refers to 
the Platonic Gorgias (466a-479c), where Socrates explains that only he who knows and acts 
Inner Peace and Personal Identity. Reflections on the Unity of the Confessions [135]
Augustine suffers from the aftermath of his glory (“it confused  [vertebat] my 
mind even more”, conf. 6, 6, 10), and consumes himself with sorrows (conf., 6, 
6, 10), being “in the same mud of  hungering [fruendi] after the momentary, 
fleeting things that were tearing me apart [dissipantibus me]” (conf., 6, 11, 18). 
Because, by enjoyment (frui) of transient goods, he inverts the divine order 
which commands only to use them (uti), he misses the goal of his pursuit of 
happiness: “And if any good fortune smiled on me, I was reluctant to grasp it 
because just before I seized it, it always fluttered out of reach” (conf., 6, 6, 10). 
The desperate attempt to find happiness in the enjoyment of perishable and 
corruptible things disturbs his peace of mind and leads to “sighing and groan-
ing” (conf., 6, 14, 24), because “winds were blowing and driving my heart first 
one way and then another” (conf., 6, 11, 20). Augustine describes the climax of 
his emotional suffering, the separation from his long-standing concubine, in 
the context of his view that the lover integrates the object of his love in his or 
her own identity, as intrapsychic fragmentation and tearing out a part of his 
self: “My heart […] was broken and pierced, leaving a trail of blood” (conf., 6, 15, 
25). This mental rupture in the turn to lower goods or to evil threatens to lead 
to a dissolution of the personal self, “as if I were already dead” (conf., 6, 1, 1).
As a doctor and therapist of his mental illness Augustine sees, unlike the phil-
osophical tradition,29 not philosophy but the triune God. Again, within the 
frame of his narrative construction of identity  relating to his doctrine of grace, 
he interprets his mental peace- and restlessness as a divine indication of his 
moral and theological misorientation, which should point to the right path: “I 
became more pitiable, and you drew closer still“ (conf., 6, 16, 26).30 This divine 
providence of Augustine’s journey through life “is everlasting” (conf., 6, 14, 24) 
and brings “that broad and well-worn way of the world” to a happy end (conf., 
6, 14, 24). At the end of the book, Augustine notes that this goal is peaceful rest, 
thus harmonizing the content of his claim that absolute calm is granted only 
to homo in pace at the end of time with the formal composition: “You are the 
only rest (requies)” (conf., 6, 26, 26).
for the good does truly what he wants, because only through the good the eudaimonia as the 
goal of all human aspiration can be achieved.
29 See Plato, Charm., 157ab; Epicurus, gnom. vat., 54; Cicero, Tusc., 3, 6, and (after Augustine) 
Boethius, cons., 1, pr. 1.
30 See conf., 6, 9.
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Confessions VII
The seventh book, which deals with Augustine’s transition from  youth (ad-
ulescentia) to manhood (iuventus), points out the  connection between a failed 
identity constitution and a  mistaken image of God too: “I was not even trans-
parent to my own self. Whatever was not extended through some degree of 
space…, I jud ged that no such thing could exist [not even God, D. K.]” (conf., 7, 
1, 2). Nevertheless, Augustine’s image of God has  evolved: “I believed with all 
my heart that you were imperishable and  invulnerable and immutable [incor-
ruptibilem et inviolabilem et incommutabilem]” (conf., 7, 1, 1). With the immu-
tabilitas of God, Augustine  highlights an essential characteristic of the divine 
natu re, which goes hand in hand with his inviolable rest. However, because 
physical natures bound in space cannot have this immutability, Augustine’s 
conception of God is not only wrong but also inconsistent, and  consequently 
cannot be a haven of peace and tranquillity: “Meanwhile I was scrutinizing 
those things that are contained in space, and there I found no place to rest 
[ad requiescendum]” (conf., 7, 7, 11). The idea of a physical but unchanging God 
is a reversal of the true order and prevents Augustine from  fitting in with this 
order and thus finding inner peace: “This was the  proper median and central 
zone of my salvation, to remain in your image and serve you by governing my 
body” (conf., 7, 7, 11). As pure spirit, God is at the head of ontological and moral 
order, while man as a bodily as well as a spiritual being is created in the image 
of God only in his spiritual nature and occupies an intermediate position by 
exercising the dominion of the spirit over the body and by submission to God. 
In this sense, the integration of corporeality into the conception of God turns 
everything upside down.
In presenting his indoctrination on the true nature of God, Augustine revisits 
his interpretation of God as a healer in the sixth book as well as the therapeu-
tic character of aversive affects:
Thanks to the unseen touch of your hand doing its healing work, my swell-
ing began to go down, while my mental perception, formerly agitated and 
obscured, was getting better day by day thanks to the effective ointment of 
wholesome afflictions (conf., 7, 8, 12).
This healing takes place through the acquaintance with the Platonicorum libri 
(conf., 7, 9, 13), which proclaim the spirituality of God and locate the  knowledge 
of God in the spirit of man: “All this  warned me to come back to myself. I 
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 entered deep within myself under your guidance, for you became my helper”31 
(conf., 7, 10, 16). This new realization is, firstly, linked to the insight that know-
ledge of God and pious love are connected with each other (“Love knows it”, 
conf., 7, 10, 16), and secondly, that the fragmented and broken identity has 
been a salutary chastisement by God: “And I realized that… you have made 
my soul dwindle away  (tabescere fecisti) like the threads of a cobweb” (conf., 7, 
10, 16). The  bitter remedy motivates misguided Augustine to continue with his 
search for God—with success: “And you called from far off, ‘Truly I am who I 
am’ [immo vero ego sum qui sum]” (conf., 7, 10, 16). The biblical name of God (Ex. 
3: 14) is an emphatic reference to the fact that the Christian God as well as the 
Neoplatonic divine is the paradigm of identity in the sense of selfsameness: 
“You who are the same [idem] forever” (conf., 7, 20, 27).32 Even the problem of 
evil, which Augustine saw satisfactorily clarified for many years only by Man-
ichaean dualism, can be solved now by referring to the Neoplatonically in-
spired privatio boni-theory: While only God “abides unchangingly” (conf., 7, 11, 
17) in the emphatic sense of the word, all other things are qua being creatures 
subject to becoming and change. Because the notion of destroying implies 
harm, and the concept of damage presupposes the existence of a good dimin-
ished by the damage, all created destructible things must be good. The fact 
that things are good to varying degrees is not a shortcoming, but a sign of the 
well-formed order of goods (conf., 7, 13, 19).33 Against the Manichean idea of a 
struggle between a realm of darkness and a realm of light Augustine states: “…
because there is nothing outside of it [i.e. of God’s created world, D. K.] that 
could burst into it and cause the order that you have placed upon it to become 
perishable” (conf., 7, 13, 19).
Augustine no longer conceives sin as substantial, but as a “deviation of the will 
that is misdirected away from the highest essence, which is you who are God” 
(conf., 7, 16, 22). Interesting is Augustine’s explication of this will: the evil will 
is, firstly, a will that turns to lower-ranking goods in a way that is only due to 
those of higher rank—this will coincides with the perverted love that we have 
already discussed (conf., 7, 16, 22). Secondly, it is a will “that casts out what lies 
31 This is a critique of the Neoplatonic superbia as well as a reference to his theology of grace. 
32 See also conf., 7, 20, 26.
33 See lib. arb., 3, 9, 91: “Likewise, you should think about the differences of souls, so that you 
too realize here that the misfortune that hurts you also serves to ensure that the perfection 
of the universe does not lack those souls who have had to  become unhappy because they 
wanted to be sinful.”
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deep within it” (conf., 7, 16, 22)—this describes the externalization of identity 
through the  integration of the transitory object of love into the self, which 
thereby is threatened in its integrity. Moreover, the evil will is a will that “puffs 
itself up” (conf., 7, 16, 22). Augustine here hints at pride (superbia) as the central 
human vice and mainspring of the Fall (civ., 14, 13), which favours perverted 
self-love over the love of God and strives to take on the rank of God himself.34 
On the other hand, the humilitas (conf., 7, 18, 24) exemplarily shown by Christ 
is the central virtue of those who are gripped by the true love of God. In conf. 7, 
10, 16, and 17, 23, Augustine reports on two Neoplatonic ascensions to God. He 
describes their  aftermaths by revival of the  metaphor of spiritual food intend-
ed to fill the inner emptiness: “…carrying with me no more than a loving mem-
ory and, as it were, longing to smell the sweet savour of food that I could not 
as yet consume” (conf., 7, 17, 23). The lasting enjoyment of God as well as the in-
tegration of God into his own self (metaphorically described as incorporation) 
and its healing transformation will only take place when Augustine recognizes 
Christ as “mediator between God and humanity” (conf., 7, 18, 24). Until then, 
he remains in the regio dissimilitudinis: “Then I discovered that I was far away 
from you, in a place of unlikeness” (conf., 7, 10, 16). This regio dissimilitudinis is 
relevant to our topic (“being unlike” is a counter-concept to “identity” in the 
sense of “sameness” and “self-sameness”), and can be interpreted in various 
ways.35 Enlightening in this regard is Augustine’s statement about the works 
of creation in the context of the interpretation of Gen. 1: 1: “The further things 
are from you, the more unlike you (dissimilius) they become—and not in terms 
of physical distance” (conf., 12, 7, 7). “Unlikeness” thus refers to the relationship 
with God: if Augustine doesn’t succeed in integrating the divine into his own 
self through enduring enjoyment (frui) of God, and in doing so becomes like 
him (as far as this is possible for human beings), he is still estranged from God 
and himself as a living being created in the image of God (imago Dei) and thus 
misses his genuine identity. In a certain sense, he is also “dissimilar” to himself 
in his striving and pursuits, because he is tormented by the unpacified discord 
between right and misguided love or good and evil will—it is no coincidence 
that Augustine elaborates on this struggle of will in the following book in de-
tail. Thirdly, he is also alienated from the mind as the core of his self.36 The 
mind acts as the place of reunification of the individual which is divided in 
34 See Augustine’s narration of the pear theft in conf., 2, 4, 9; 4, 14. Overall, there are 32 refer-
ences to superbia in books 1-9 of the Confessions (Trelenberg 271).
35 For the Platonic origin of this thought, cf. Plato, Pol., 273e; and Ferguson.
36 See Plato’s characterization of the rational soul part (logistikon) as “inner man (anthrôpos)” 
(rep., 9, 588c).
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past, present and future, thus creating unity in the diachronically developing 
self.37 It identifies the present with the past self as well as with the future self 
and makes these different selves similar to each another. With regard to social 
peace, false enjoyment of transient goods generates difference (dissimilitudo) 
and opposition between people too. While those who enjoy God are like each 
other in their shared pursuit of the vision of God and live in peace (en. Ps., 84, 
10), those who cling to temporal things struggle for limited goods that cannot 
be common possessions of all, and thereby become dissimilar and hostile to 
one another. 
The seventh book closes with reference to rest and peace in God together 
with Augustine’s Christian demarcation to the Platonic tradition. While the 
Neoplatonists teach “to see the homeland of peace [patriam pacis] …[they] fail 
to find the way to it” because of the disregard for Christ’s salvific act (conf., 7, 
21, 27).
Confessions VIII
The gracious gift of being “more firmly established in you” (conf., 8, 1, 1), which 
far exceeds mere knowledge of God and at the same time goes hand in hand 
with a greater firmness and stability in the self, is the theme of the eighth 
book. The familiar motifs from the previous books are taken up again. People 
burdened by “those things that seem good [quae videntur bona]” (conf., 8, 1, 2) 
are characterized as “vain [vani]” (conf., 8, 1, 2), so that their inner emptiness 
is grasped conceptually. Rightly guided love is called again the therapeutic 
of this emptiness as well as of mental peacelessness: “Let my very bones be 
flooded with love for you [dilectione tua]” (conf., 8, 1, 1). The absence of a lasting 
peace in the self is related to the changeability of the created world: “Why is it 
that one part of things alternates between advance and decline, conflict and 
reconciliation?” (conf., 8, 2, 8). 
While the previous books spoke primarily of the dichotomy of right and mis-
guided love, Augustine now discusses intrapsychic peacelessness as a struggle 
between the remaining perverted will, solidified by time and habituation, and 
the new will. In contrast to the evil will, which strives for the enjoyment of 
perishable goods, the pious will implies “to enjoy you, o God” (conf., 8, 5, 10).38 
37 See Augustine’s analysis of time in book 11.
38 Emotions, which Augustine summarizes under the generic term “love”, are closely connect-
ed with the will: “They are all …nothing other than volitions” (civ., 14, 6). Reversely, Augustine 
also sums up the will as love (amor) (conf., 13, 9, 10). Accordingly, he describes the struggle of 
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The designation of God as “the only sure pleasure” (conf., 8 , 5, 10) refers to the 
lastingness of God and the  spiritual peace of those who love God. But Augus-
tine is not that far yet. There still rages in him a painful volitional war:39 “And 
so my two wills, one old, the other new, one physical, the other spiritual, were 
in conflict with one another and by their strife [discordando] were shattering 
[dissipabant)] my soul” (conf., 8, 5, 10). This inner struggle causes a split in the 
self and frustrates a harmonious identity formation. In addition to tendencies 
of striving (voluntates), Augustine also knows a decision-making faculty (li-
berum arbitrium),40 which judges the voluntates and expresses a preference 
regarding their effectiveness to come into action. But weakness of the will 
(difficultas),41 as one of many punishments for original sin, prevents this pref-
erence of goodwill from being put into action. Augustine explains the fact, that 
hereby the personal self is divided in several ways, as follows:
I was enmeshed in both but more in the form of desire that I approved of in 
myself than in the one I disapproved of. For in that which I disapproved, my 
ego was less itself [magis iam non ego], because I was to a great extent al-
ready enduring it against my will [invitus] rather than engaging in it willingly 
[volens] (conf., 8, 5, 11).42 
Augustine is at war with himself:43 “With what rods of condemnation did I not 
lash my soul, to make it follow me as I tried to go after you? And it resisted, 
recoiled, but did not excuse itself” (conf., 8, 7, 18). During this time, Augus-
tine hears several conversion reports: the public confession of the rhetorician 
Marius Victorinus to Christianity, Pontician’s report on the Egyptian ascetic 
will as a conflict between the love of God and the perverted desire: “Likewise I was convinced 
that it was better for me to give myself up to your love than to give myself up to my desire; 
but although the former course of action was both attractive and convincing, the latter was 
more tempting and had me in its coils” (conf., 8, 5, 12, Hammond’s translation slightly modi-
fied). See also Kiesel “Die Emotionstheorie”; and “Voluntas.”
39 For different interpretations of the will struggle see Brachtendorf “Augustine’s Notion”; 
Müller; and Kiesel “Wille und Personalität.”
40 See den Bok.
41 On the Augustinian concept of difficultas see Drecoll and Kudella 117. See also conf., 8, 10, 
22: “So I was in conflict with myself, and my very identity was disintegrating, and the actual 
disintegration was in fact taking place quite against my will… for I was a son of Adam.”
42 I changed Hammond’s translation slightly.
43 In connection with our topic it is noteworthy that, analysing his will-struggle, Augustine 
speaks of his refusal “to serve in your army [militare tibi]” (conf., 8, 5, 11). See also conf., 9, 8, 
17, where Augustine tells us about his friend Evodius: “Then he put military service (militia) 
behind him and girded himself for your service instead.” 
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Antonius, and the instruction of two imperial officials in Trier, who had been 
inspired to a Christian departure from all secular aspirations by a coincidental 
encounter with the biography of Antonius. But these narratives result in even 
greater self-hatred: “The more intensely I loved [amabam] those salutary in-
tentions that I heard of… the more I came to detest and loathe myself [oderam] 
in comparison with them” (conf., 8, 7, 17). 
As in the sixth book, Augustine sees his mental state as a “disease [morbo]” 
(conf., 8, 7, 17), culminating in a state of crisis necessary for  healing. Augustine 
also interprets this emotional pain as divine chastisement: “So I was sick and 
tormented. …You redoubled the lashes of fear  [timoris] and shame [pudoris] 
to stop me from giving up again” (conf., 8, 11, 25). His healing and devotion to 
continentia is described by Augustine in the famous garden scene (conf., 8, 12, 
28-30) in the context of his meta- narrative as the work of divine grace.
Confessions IX
In the ninth book Augustine reports on his retirement from the profession as 
a rhetorician, the retreat with his friends to an  estate in Cassiciacum, and the 
subsequent return to Africa. During the trip, the mother dies in Ostia. Shortly 
before her death, she and  Augustine share a Christian and Neoplatonic-in-
spired vision. All these decisions and experiences are based on the fact that 
God has “pierced our heart with your love [caritate tua]” (conf., 9, 2, 3). The 
heart, which in antiquity was the seat of the spirit, is now so permeated with 
the love of God that the identity of Augustine has changed: he has become 
another. The identification with the divine Word is summarized by Augustine 
again in metaphors of the incorporation into the self: “And so we carried with 
us your words fixed deep within” (conf., 9, 2, 3). For that very reason the good 
will gains in strength (conf., 9, 2, 4), the emptiness of the heart fills with “joy”, 
and God begins “to grow sweet to my taste” (conf., 9, 4, 10). The  attachment to 
the “eternal simplicity [aeterna simplicitate]” (conf., 9, 4, 10) motivates the de-
sire to no longer fall into a splitting of the self in the manifold of the variable: “I 
no longer wanted to be  dragged out into the diversity [multiplicari] of worldly 
goods,44 both devouring time and being devoured by it” (conf., 9, 4, 10). 
In the context of a meditation of Psalm 4: 9, Augustine reflects on the rest (re-
quies) in peace (pax) and on the selfsameness of the divine  essence (id ipsum), 
and in this way explicitly binds together these three issues  systematically 
44 I modified Hammond’s translation.
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(conf., 9, 4, 11).45 Since the burden of his past sins disturbs this newfound peace, 
he signs in for baptism in Milan. The reference to the motif of peace is ac-
companied by the dominant presence of mother Monica in the ninth book. 
As a formative characteristic of Monica, Augustine names her peacefulness: 
She was “behaving as a peacemaker [pacificam]” (conf., 9, 9, 21), providing for 
reconciliation between those who quarrelled. Patiently she endured both her 
husband’s infidelity without instigating “acrimony [simultatem]” (conf., 9, 9, 
19), as well as the initial dislike of her mother-in-law, “who was stirred up 
against her by the mutterings of spiteful servant girls” (conf., 9, 9, 20). This 
maximum peacefulness is only possible because Monica has been taught by 
Christ, “her inmost teacher” of peace (conf., 9, 9, 21). Generally, Augustine also 
emphasizes in the narrative of his mother’s life story the initial sinfulness of 
human beings trapped in concupiscence, which must be healed by the divine 
doctor. In the case of Monica this happened through the sharp tongue of a 
slave woman who caught little Monica nibbling on her parents’ wine supply 
and called her a “drunkard”:
How did you restore her, how did you heal her? Surely what you did was to 
provoke a harsh and sharp reproof from another soul, and use it as a surgeon’s 
knife from your secret storehouse; and with one stroke you cut away that 
rottenness! (conf., 9, 8, 18).46 
The communion between mother and son in Christ culminates in the Vision 
of Ostia. The contemplative, Neoplatonic-Christian  ascension47 leads to the 
“food of truth” which “does not have the capacity either to have existed, or to 
come to exist. It simply is,  because it is eternal” (conf., 9, 10, 24), and where the 
being in relationship with the creator becomes impressive: 
Imagine… that anything which comes into being through transition grew si-
lent to that person (for all these things make the same declaration, if only one 
45 See Augustine’s comment on the death of his son Adeodatus, who now rests in the peace 
of God: “You were quick to take his life from this Earth, but I am not at all anxious when I 
remember him, for there is nothing for me to fear from his boyhood, or adolescence, and 
certainly not from his manhood” (conf., 9, 6, 14).
46 According to Augustine, physical pain can also be a divine chastisement, as it is shown by 
the following anecdote: “But I have not forgotten… the harshness of your punishment, and 
the marvelous swiftness of your mercy. You were tormenting me with toothache; and when 
it grew so severe that I could not even speak… As soon as we were knelt down in a suppliant 
posture, the pain vanished” (conf., 9, 4, 12).
47 For a detailed interpretation see Brachtendorf “Augustine’s Notion” 189-197.
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could hear it—we have not made ourselves, but the One who abides for ever 
has made us (conf., 9, 10, 25). 
Important to our question is the immediate chronological connection be-
tween the ascent to timeless beings and the death of the mother, which on 
the one hand illustrates the ontological difference between the eternity of the 
creator and the transitoriness of the creatures, and, on the other hand, shows 
the way to eternal life and the enduring fellowship with beloved fellow crea-
tures through the pious bonding with the creator. Nevertheless, as with the 
death of his childhood friend, Augustine portrays his grief in terms of a torn 
and divided self, and thus as a disruption of the personal identity arising from 
false love and “affection according to the flesh [carnalis affectus]” (conf., 9, 13, 
34): “Since, therefore, I was bereft of that great consolation that she provided, 
my soul was hurt and my life was in torment, for my life and hers had been as 
one [una facta erat]” (conf., 9, 12, 30). His prayer is not answered by God with 
a relief of the pain of separation in the first place. As in the previous books, 
he interprets this as divine discipline and doctrine with the aim of bringing 
the “habitual behaviour” of carnal love orientation as “fetters” [consuetudinis 
vinculum] home to Augustine.
But devout love is also not immune to worries, fears, and mental peaceless-
ness in a fallen world. While, immediately after her death, Monica’s “manner 
of life” and “her unfeigned faith” (conf., 9, 12, 29) let Augustine feel safe in the 
knowledge that the deceased would enter eternal blessedness, at the time of 
writing the Confessions he shed “a very different kind of tears for her, your 
servant. They flow from a spirit struck by the thought of the dangers threaten-
ing every soul that dies in Adam”48 (conf., 9, 13, 34). His request for forgiveness 
of Monica’s sins in the name of Christus medicus49 (conf., 9, 13, 35) takes up 
the topic of grace-induced salvation and at the same time reverses the rela-
tionship between Monica and her son: as Monica had prayed during her life-
time for the salvation of her son, Augustine now appeals as an advocate of his 
mother to God, thus referring to the mutual care and peace in the Christian 
community of love. This “peace” (conf., 9, 13, 37) in Christ, as the embodiment 
of which he has described Monica, he solicits now for her and thus gives the 
ninth book a worthy conclusion.
48 That is why the dying Augustine has David’s penitential psalms hung on the wall, being 
able to pray for the remission of his sins without interruption. See Possidius, Vita Augustini, 
31, 1-4.
49 On the Augustinian concept of Christus medicus see Arbesmann 1954.
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Confessions X
Although Augustine’s autobiographical account concludes with the ninth book, 
the tenth book is central to his narrative identity construction in several ways. 
On the one hand, it offers the author’s self-analysis at the time of writing,50 
and in this way links the past with the present self as well as the historical with 
the writing self, which selects and interprets subjectively certain experienc-
es:51 writing Augustine describes young Augustine and his experiences in the 
context of his current convictions and thus gives his narrative a specific co-
louring with his theology of grace. In addition,  Augustine analyzes the faculty 
of memory in the tenth book,  thereby addressing a mental faculty that is in-
dispensable for the identity construction of temporal beings, and deals with 
the inner man, whom he understands as a place of divine and self-knowledge.
Already the beginning of the book points to the connection between knowl-
edge of God and personal identity: “You know me: let me know you, let me 
know even as I am known” (conf., 10,1 1,1), and “I am open to you, Lord, who-
ever I am” (conf., 10, 2, 2). This connection has a paradoxical character. On the 
one hand, the knowledge of God requires self-knowledge, and on the other 
hand, knowledge of God is the presupposition of self-knowledge. The fact that 
 Augustine deals with memory to solve both is motivated by his  Platonic her-
itage: according to the Platonic doctrine of anamnêsis, the soul has seen the 
divine (the ideas) prior to being incarnated in the body, and must remember 
this vision for the purpose of self-knowledge and alignment with God (ho-
moiôsis theô).52
Augustine discusses as possible memory contents the images of physical 
things perceived through the senses, scientific teaching contents (grammar, 
dialectics, arithmetic, geometry) as well as affects developed in the past with 
50 There are about ten years between the death of his mother and the writing of the Con-
fessions.
51 To be sure, Augustine himself would see his narrative construction of identity as objec-
tive in the sense that he regards his meta-narrative (i.e. the doctrine of grace) as biblically 
founded and thus as divine truth. Nevertheless, the uncertainties about one’s own identity 
and the requests to God often expressed in the Confessions show the fundamental epistemic 
uncertainty (ignorantia) of fallen man, and Augustine himself confesses that the (subjective) 
interpretation of one’s own experiences can change in the course of personal development 
(conf., 10, 14, 21).
52 See Plato, Phd. 72e-77a; and Phdr. 249bc. On the question of a priori knowledge see conf., 
10, 10, 17, and on the connection of memory and identity conf., 10, 16, 25: “I am a creature who 
remembers; I am a mind.” 
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certain experiences. For all memory contents, Augustine establishes a link 
with the topic of personal identity. In the course of discussing sensually per-
ceived natural phenomena, he expresses his astonishment on the power of 
memory with a metaphor that considers the internalization of these things: 
“Even so, when I looked at them with my eyes, I did not absorb [nec… absorbui] 
them into myself by the act of looking at them”53 (conf., 10, 8, 15). The conclud-
ing insight that it is not the objects themselves, but merely their pictures that 
are within Augustine, expresses their significance for Augustine’s identity too: 
Before he can ask the question of the origin of natural beauties and powers or 
the place of man in the natural order within the framework of a sophisticated 
identity construction, he must first perceive their existence and incorporate 
this into his memory as permanent knowledge.
Augustine describes the learning of sciences and corresponding intellectual 
operations in terms of a synthetic and order-setting unity: “This is nothing 
than using our thought processes to bind together  (cogitando quasi conligere) 
things that our memory contains in a  random  disorder” (conf., 10, 11, 18). It is 
note worthy that Augustine uses in his  etymological interpretation of the verb 
 cogitare (“to think”) the same terminology as in his analysis of personal frag-
mentation and dissolution of the self in the transient manifold of the external 
world. Because the contents of knowledge “must be gathered up again so that 
they can be known: that is, out of their diffusion [ex quadam dispersione] they 
must be bound together: from this comes the term ‘cogitate’” (conf., 10, 11, 18). 
Augustine’s insight that only the mind (animus) is capable of this synthesizing 
activity, is also not surprising. It is true that the human mind belongs to the 
mutable works of creation,54 but insofar as it is an intangible nature and ac-
tualizes the god-like image of man as well as, ideally, the orientation towards 
God, it is the unifying faculty in the human being par excellence. Also, moods 
and feelings preserved in the mind are central in the context of human identity 
formation. On the one hand, the reconstruction of experiences is essential to 
the memory of emotions associated with these experiences: without the depth 
and density, aversive affects as well as pleasurable emotions bring about, hu-
man experiences are empty. On the other hand, the reflection and emotional 
mirroring of past emotions impressively show changes in self-image and iden-
tity over time: “When I happily recall my past sadness, my mind experiences 
53 I modified Hammond’s translation slightly.
54 See conf., 10, 35, 36: “So too you yourself are not the mind, because you are God and Lord 
over the mind. And all these things undergo change, but you remain unchangeable over all 
things”. 
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happiness and my memory contains sadness” (conf., 10, 14, 21). As we have 
seen in the previous books, the author of the Confessions, in remembrance of 
once-enjoyed sexual lust, may feel sadness, repentance, and revulsion for his 
former moral depravity, or gratitude for emotional pain, motivating him to long 
for God. The thought of mental processing or “digestion”55 of previously emo-
tionally troubling experiences can also be found here: “…happiness and sad-
ness are like sweet and bitter food for it. When they are committed to memory, 
it is as if they were transferred into the stomach to be stored there; they can 
no longer impart any taste” (conf., 10, 14, 21). This motif of incorporation as a 
metaphor for integration into one’s identity can also be found in the following 
passages, where Augustine ponders the  divine  presence in human mind: “You 
breathed your fragrance onto me: and I drew in my breath and I pant for you. I 
have  tasted you: and now I hunger and thirst for more. You have touched me: 
and I have burned for your peace (pacem tuam)” (conf., 10, 27, 38).56  Augustine 
defines the divine food, which he has tasted in small  bites, more closely as the 
“blessed life” (conf., 10 ,17, 29), “enjoyment of the truth” (conf., 10, 22, 33), and—as 
in the above quote—as peace. Because only God can offer reliable happiness, 
true peace of mind and its unclouded joy are found exclusively in him: “And 
that is the real ‘blessed life’—rejoicing toward you, about you, because of you” 
(conf., 10, 22, 32). This joy again is an expression of pious love which enjoys 
God alone. In this material world,  however, people are only “blessed in their 
hope of it” (conf., 10, 20, 29): “You shine brightly and are pleased, and loved, and 
longed-for” (conf., 10, 2, 2). Only in eternity God is “present experience” (conf., 
10, 20, 29). Even in the state of grace, man is still threatened by the disturbing 
invasion of perverted love, and suffers of mental strife: “Surely human life on 
earth is a time of interminable trial?” (conf., 10, 28, 39).57
In the last third of the book, Augustine describes his present state of mind as 
still tormented by wrong love which he outlines through the triad of lusts in 1 
Joh. 2: 15-17: “Anyone who loves something else as well as you, but does not love 
it for your sake, loves you the less as a result” (conf., 10, 29, 40). Again, Augustine 
points repeatedly to God’s unerring insight into the depths of the human soul: 
“After all, Lord, what is there of myself that could stay hidden before you—in 
whose sight the bottomless pit of human guilt is laid bare—even if I did not want 
to make confession to you?” (conf., 10, 2, 2). God knows the trials and tribula-
55 The metaphor of digesting emotional experiences is found excessively in  Nietzsche. See 
Nachlass 1881, 11[258]; Die fröhliche Wissenschaft V 364; and see Also sprach Zarathustra III, 
Vom Geist der Schwere 2.
56 See conf., 10, 17, 26.
57 See conf., 10, 32, 48.
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tions of Augustine’s soul, which make him question his own identity: “Before 
your eyes I have become a puzzle to myself” (conf., 10, 33, 50). False human self-
love and the penalty of ignorance prevent true insight into the inner self, which 
can only succeed with divine help: “But I do not know whether I am like this.58 
In this matter I know myself less well than you. I beg you, O my God, make me 
clear to myself as well” (conf., 10, 37, 62). God also knows the authenticity of his 
grief over the remaining false desires: “On this subject you know how my heart 
groans to you” (conf., 10, 37, 60). Only the temporary despair of God’s grace and 
the self-induced relapse into concupiscence can alienate man from God and 
thus from himself too: “I have been cast out from before your eyes” (conf., 10, 
41, 66).
Among the lusts of the flesh (concupiscentia carnalis),  especially sexual imag-
inations and nocturnal ejaculations torture him, in  addition to culinary temp-
tations, against which he leads “a daily war [cotidianum  bellum]”59 (conf., 10, 30, 
43). He reflects the latter in the context of self-alienation and a disturbed iden-
tity: “Surely, O Lord my God, I am still myself when sleeping? But there is such 
a big difference between my waking self and my sleeping self in that moment 
when I make the transition from here into sleep or back from sleep to here!” 
(conf., 10, 30, 41). The pleasures of hearing and the “physical pleasure of my 
eyes” disturb peace and “rest” (conf., 10, 34, 51) of the soul too. The temptation 
of curiosity “diverts my thoughts” (conf., 10, 35, 57) from the turn to the inner 
self as a place of God’s presence and of unity (conf., 10, 34, 52), outward into the 
sphere of diversity and dispersion. The healing of “that pestilence” of bitterness 
(conf., 10, 37, 60) takes place solely through the  ministry of God’s grace (conf., 
10, 29, 40; 30, 42). In the form of “continence [contentia]” through which “we 
are joined together and restored to wholeness, from which we trickled away 
into  multiplicity” (conf., 10, 29, 40), it unifies the personal self and creates a lim-
ited inner peace that leads to the “fullness of peace [pacem plenariam]” (conf., 
10, 30, 42; 38, 63; 11, 65) of the eternal blessed in the peaceful communion of 
“those who eat and are satisified” (conf., 10, 13, 70). The central notion 
of continentia should not be understood exclusively as sexual abstinence. As 
has often been said,60 the literal meaning of continentia is “holding together”, 
and, in the  light of the dispersion and fragmentation of the self into manifold 
58 I slightly changed Hammond’s translation.
59 My translation. For the remaining inner war in the baptized see. Iul., 2, 7, 5: “...in the bap-
tized, so to speak, survives a civil war of internal mistakes;” and 4, 33, 2: “You do not spend 
a day without an internal war.”
60 See Fischer 76; and von Herrmann, 33.
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external things, it is to be understood as a desired accompanying phenome-
non of the orientation towards God.
Confessions XI
With the eleventh book begins the interpretation of the creation account in 
Gen. 1, 2, 3. For Augustine’s narrative identity construction, this is just as rele-
vant as the ontological location of man (and therefore his own) in creation and 
his relationship to the creator, as well as for his concept of personal identity as 
a peaceful inner-soul unity that can succeed only by turning to the creator.61 
The interpretation of the first verse of the bible, “In the beginning God cre-
ated the heavens and the earth,” evokes the question of God’s  activity before 
this beginning, and thus the idea of a temporality of God. Augustine solves the 
problem with  reference to the concept of creation through the eternal Word 
that he  equates with Christ (conf., 11, 9, 11), and the fact that time itself is one 
of the works of creation (conf., 11, 14, 17). On the other hand, the creator him-
self is “antecedent to all times (ante omnia tempora)” (conf., 11, 13, 16), and his 
“eternity  (aeternitas)” (conf., 11, 1,1) is, in  contrast to the discursive and linear 
succession of temporal  beings, an all-embracing presence of the “all at once” 
(conf., 11, 8, 9): “Your ‘today’ is eternity” (conf., 11, 13, 16). The very same thing 
is the  reason for God’s absolute identity, who is “always the same [idem ipse]” 
(conf., 11, 13, 16), because he is not subject to diachronic change. As opposed 
to this, the presence of man is so fleeting that it cannot be grasped because it 
“has no extension in time” (conf., 11, 15, 20). 
The past and the future too are subject to volatility: “In eternity  nothing pass-
es, but everything is in the present” (conf., 11, 11, 13). The fact that in a certain 
sense the “past no longer exists; and what is future does not yet exist” (conf., 
11, 15, 18), refers to the ontological inferiority of the temporal. It is also signif-
icant that the human mind, as an entity created in the image of God, has the 
function of visualizing the three times (conf., 11, 20, 26) and thereby bringing 
them into being in an imperfect imitation of the divine act of creation (conf., 
11, 17, 22).62 The diachronic change of man and his imprisonment in either re-
61 The reference to the topic “personal identity” in the last three books of the  Confessions 
is, as will be shown below, remarkable. In this respect, Augustine’s exegetical deliberations 
concerning the creation account in the Confessions differ from his remarks in De Genesi 
adversus Manichaeos, De Genesi ad Litteram liber imperfectus, and De Genesi ad Litteram. I 
am grateful for this comment to the reviewer. 
62 See the Platonic concept of time (chronos) as a moving image of eternity (aiôn) in Tim. 37d.
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pentance or longing for the past and in his concern or desire for the future 
are partly responsible for disturbances of his identity: “My life is a kind of dis-
traction. …But I became alienated [dissilui] as I entered into time, not knowing 
the order in which it passes, and my thoughts, the inmost part of my soul, are 
ripped apart [dilaniantur] by turbulent vicissitudes, until I flow back together 
toward you, purged and shining with the fire of your love” (conf., 11, 29, 39). 
Because times never rest (conf., 11, 11, 13), Augustine’s heart, bound to temporal 
things, is without peace, “until I flow back together toward you, purged, and 
shining with the fire of your love” (conf., 11, 29, 39). This confluence in God, 
which allows him to “stand fast and be established in you” (conf., 11, 30, 40), is 
again expressed by Augustine metaphorically as an incorporation of spiritual 
nourishment into his own self: “Let me drink of you” (conf., 11, 1, 4). This trans-
gression of the ontological boundary between man and God becomes possible 
through Christ: “Your  right hand has supported me in my Lord who as the Son 
of Man is  mediator between you who are the One, and us who are many…. I 
forgot what is past, and instead of being distracted I reach out, not for what 
is in the future and so transitory, but for those things which are before me: I 
press forward, going in the right direction, rather than being distracted, to the 
prize of my highest calling” (conf., 11, 29, 39).
Augustine wishes the peace which the harmonious unity of the self will bring 
with it, not only for himself, but in “brotherly love” (conf., 11, 1, 3) also for the 
neighbour. In turn, the desire for universal peace expresses Augustine’s own 
activity as a peacemaker, thus fulfilling Jesus’ commandment to be peaceful 
(pacificus) (conf., 11, 1, 1).
Confessions XII
In the twelfth book Augustine presents a Neoplatonic interpretation of Gen. 
1: 1-2. According to Psalm 113, 16, Augustine understands God’s “heaven” cre-
ated in the beginning to be “the heaven of heaven” and “intellectual creation 
[creatura… aliqua intellectualis]” (conf., 12, 9, 9), where the city of God (civitas 
Dei) is gathered with all angels and saints.63 On the other hand, he interprets 
the first created “Earth” in Gen. 1, 1 as unformed and dark matter (Gen. 1: 2), 
which represents the basic material for the formation of individual things. Due 
to the creatio ex nihilo (conf., 12, 7, 7), all created things suffer to varying degrees 
from an ontological deficit: the higher the form of the creature, the closer it 
63 It is uncertain what Augustin understood exactly by the “heaven of heaven.” This interpre-
tation can be found in Fuhrer 120.
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is to God, and the farther it is from him, the more “unlike [dissimilius]” (conf., 
12, 7, 7) it is to him. With man’s task of perfecting his spiritual image in God to 
be similar to him to the maximum extent possible, the stability of the self, per-
sonal unity, and inner-soul peace emerge: God as a paradigm of identity (he is 
“the same and the same, and the same (idipsum et idipsum et idipsum),” conf. 
12, 6, 7), is a haven of peace and tranquillity, while the restlessness of creatures 
is related to temporality as well as to matter-based variability (conf., 12, 6, 6). 
The spiritually gifted beings have the option to pursuit either the eternal and 
unchanging God or temporal and variable things, and thereby strengthen or 
weaken both their inner peace and their diachronic identity: “It is true that 
anything that clings so closely to an unchanging form that it does not change 
[though it is capable of changing]” (conf., 12, 19, 28). This approach to God man-
ifests through the love of God and neighbour (conf., 12, 18 ,27), which is realized 
by the above-mentioned spiritual creature in the consummation of pure love 
and thus “rises above all the whirling fluctuation of time” (conf., 12, 9, 9). With 
the stabilization of one’s self and the inner peace thus effected, the external 
peace of communion with one another in heaven’s heaven goes hand in hand 
with the connection to
your loveliness without the blemish of abandoning it for something else: it is 
the pure intelligence of holy and spiritual things, who are the citizens of your 
city that is in heaven (above this visible heaven), harmoniously at one upon a 
foundation of peace [stabilimento pacis] (conf., 12, 11, 12). 
Augustine now sees the time before his conversion as a  departure from the 
Eternal, whose inviting voice was drowned out by the “outcry of the unquiet 
[tumultus impacatorum]”, and to whose  life-giving “fountain” he now returns 
“to drink from (bibam)” (conf., 12, 10, 10). Augustine will not leave the shelter 
“beneath your wings” (conf., 12 ,11, 13)—a reference to the dove of peace be-
tween God and man that Noah sent after the Flood to explore the water lev-
el (Gen. 8: 11), as well as to the peacemaker Monica—or “turn aside you until 
you bind up all that I am, from this disintegrating [dispersione] and misshapen 
state, into the peace of my dearest mother …and establish me [confirmes] for 
ever” (conf., 12, 16, 23).
Peace is also the subject of Augustine’s hermeneutical reflections on the mul-
tiple sense of Scripture in conf. 12, 14, 17 and 32, 43, underlying his remarks on 
various possible interpretations of the discussed Genesis passage. In confor-
mity with his previous analysis, he defines God as the source of immutable 
truth (conf., 12, 30, 41), who can “bring forth harmony amid such a variety of 
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true opinions” (conf., 12, 30, 41), and determines his very hermeneutic approach 
as “brotherly and peaceable [fraternam ac pacificam]” (conf., 12, 25, 35). At the 
same time, it is an expression of the pious “love [caritatem] on account of which 
he whose words are we trying to explain said it all” (conf., 12, 25, 35). This love 
connects the siblings in Christ both with each other and with God (conf., 12, 30, 
41), and stands in contrast with the false (self-)love of those who move “from 
truth to lies [mendacium]” (conf., 12, 25, 34; see also 13, 25, 38).
Confessions XIII
The twelfth book presents an allegorical, historical and typological exegesis of 
the entire first creation account in Gen. 1-2: 3,64 and at the same time offers 
a compilation of all theories that are systematically relevant to the topic of 
personal identity. 
God’s absolute ontological identity (“for you yourself are the same” [tu autem 
idem ipse es], conf. 13, 18, 22)65 is handled both from an ethical point of view 
(as the epitome of goodness he “can never be changed  either for better or for 
worse”, conf. 13, 3, 4), and under the aspect of beata vita: “To you, it is not one 
thing to live, and another to live in bliss—because you are bliss itself” (conf., 13, 
3, 4). At the same time, the goodness of creation is described in terms of form, 
order, and unity: the divine design of the world by the shaping of unformed 
matter  creates the unity (unitas) of things and subjects, and makes them a 
good  (bonum) (conf., 13, ,2) that has a definite place in the scala naturae and the 
divine order. The fact that the individual works of creation are each judged by 
God to be “good”, and that only creation as a whole qualifies as “very good”, is 
due to Augustine’s explanation of the higher order of the tympanic structure 
of the world: “parts which, even though they are beautiful individually, come 
together to accomplish an even more attractive whole” (conf., 13, 28, 43). By 
their giftedness with will and reason, natures who possess a rational mind 
(angels and men) are capable “to cleave [haerere] to you constantly” (conf., 13 
2, 3), and thus to reach “blessed rest [ad beatam requiem]” (conf., 13, 8, 9), or by 
turning away from him fall into unrest and misfortune. While the attachment 
to the creator through the love of God as a gift of the Holy Spirit “sublimates 
us to that place” (conf., 13, 9, 10), the sorrowful love and the oppressive burden 
of desires plunge us into the abyss (conf., 13, 7, 8). Right love is inseparably 
connected with goodwill and, by being oriented towards the divine order of 
64 For the sake of brevity, a detailed analysis will be omitted. 
65 See conf., 13, 31, 46: God, “who is… existence itself [est est].”
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goods, at the same time ensures the order in the human soul, which finds 
therefore rest and peace: “What is out of its proper place is restless” (conf., 13, 
9, 10), but “in having goodwill do we find peace” (conf., 13, 9, 10). 
The disciples of goodwill and true love, who consider God alone as the object 
of enjoyment, while using all other things for the sake of God, sees Augustine 
symbolized in the mainland (Gen. 1: 6-10) which is separated from the water 
(i. e. the adherents of “worldly, earthly happiness”, conf., 13, 17, 20).66 In the 
context of personal identity, the Augustinian attribution of earth to life and 
bitter water to death is significant: as we have already seen, love integrates 
the beloved object into one’s own identity, thus assimilating the loving person 
to the beloved. While the love of God approaches the epitome and creator of 
all life, and while its pleasures are “life-giving [vitales]” (conf., 13, 21, 29; 22, 32), 
the  sinfully loving one becomes the slave of,
pride in self-aggrandizement, and delight in excessive sexual appetite, and 
toxic curiosity [which, D. K.] are operations of a soul that is dead—not dead in 
the sense that it is utterly inert, but because it departs from the wellspring of 
life and is adopted by this passing age and is conformed to it (conf., 13, 21, 30). 
His pleasures are in this sense “deadly [mortiferis]” (conf., 13, 21, 29) because 
they result in the second and final death of eternal damnation. 
In keeping with his conviction of the inviolable integrity of God, Augustine 
states that evil also is subject to the “command” of God and his order: he sets 
firm “limits, as to how far the waters [of evil, D. K] are allowed to advance so 
that their waves break upon themselves” (conf., 13, 17, 20).
The condition of the possibility of an approximation of the human soul to God 
is also suggested by Augustine in the thirteenth book with deliberations, that 
come to their systematic conclusion in De trinitate (399-419) (Brachtendorf  “Au-
gustins Confessiones” 285-289): the divine trinity is represented in man through 
the unity of being [esse], knowing [nosse] and volition [velle] (conf., 13, 11, 12).67 
Although Augustine in the thirteenth book still underlines the  difference be-
tween that “which exists unchangeably, and knows unchangeably, and wills 
unchangeably” (conf., 13, 11, 12), and man, who accomplishes all of this in the 
context of his mutabilitas, his already mentioned explanations of the spiritu-
66 This is a pre-reference to the doctrine of the duality of civitas Dei and civitas terrena in 
civ. (412-426).
67 Remarkable is Augustine’s view that inner Christian peace is the prerequisite for being able 
to grasp the secret of the Holy Trinity (conf., 13, 11, 12).
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al creature, which, when fully connected to God, is not subject to temporal 
change (conf., 12, 19, 28), show that he considers a substantial approximation 
with God possible. This too is, like all good things that come to man, due “to 
your grace alone” (conf., 13, 3, 4). Augustine summarizes this effect of grace in 
terms that suggest that God gives himself to the blessed and thus integrates 
himself into their selves: in the human being God gives himself by creating 
man in the imago Dei. When Augustine chooses, with a view to human knowl-
edge, to say, “Whatever they see as being good, therefore, in the Spirit of God, 
it is not they but God who sees that it is good” (conf., 13, 31, 46), then he seems 
to refer to the doctrine of Christ as inner teacher in De magistro (388-391) as 
well as to his doctrine of illumination (vera rel., 71). After all, right-will is ac-
companied by the “love of God” which “has been shed abroad [diffusa] in our 
hearts” (conf., 13, 31, 46), and in this way man becomes similar to the triune god.
The formal conclusion of the thirteenth book and the Confessions as a whole, 
discusses what the homo sub gratia hopes (in spe), firstly, for the end of earthly 
history, and secondly, for the consummation of his own creaturely existence. 
While Augustine’s soul is still “sad [tristis]” and in a state of restless trouble 
[conturbas me] (conf., 13, 14, 15) even after God’s act of grace, the rest of God 
at the seventh day after the completion of his creation points to the perfect 
and never-ending rest of the community of the blessed at the end of time: 
“Lord God, grant us peace (for you have bestowed everything on us) the peace 
of rest, the peace of sabbath, peace where evening never comes” (conf., 13, 
25, 50). The motif that comes up in this quote which is part of his meta-nar-
rative of divine grace continues throughout the following considerations. 
God, who will endow his chosen children with the unclouded peace of eternal 
bliss, is also the giver of that which justifies the reward of that blissful rest: 
“…after our works (likewise ‘very good’ because you bestowed them on us), 
should rest in you in the Sabbath of eternal life” (conf., 13, 36, 51).68 The follow-
ing lines bring out the closest possible alignment with the divine as well as the 
associated integration of the creator into one’s own identity through the love 
of God: “Even then you will rest in us, as now you are at work in us; and so 
that rest of yours will pervade us just as those works of yours pervade us now” 
(conf., 13, 37, 52). Once again, Augustine refers to the connection between the 
timelessness of God and his absolute peace and immutability: “But you, Lord, 
are always at work and always in  repose: you do not see in time, act in time, rest 
in time; but yet you create our seeing in time, and time itself, and rest in time” 
(conf., 13, 37, 52). As Augustine has already shown, inner peace requires turning 
68 See conf., 13, 38, 53.
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to the good. In this respect too, the holy goodness of God is the ideal: “You are 
the Good, you need no good thing, you are always at rest, since you yourself are 
your own rest” (conf., 14, 38, 53).
His own alignment with and participation in this good is carried out by Au-
gustine performatively with his final word, which also illustrates the prayer 
character of the Confessions as well as their form as a narrative identity con-
struction under the guideline of a Christian meta-narrative: “Amen” (conf., 
13, 38, 53). Moreover, it etymologically refers to the theme of a peaceful and 
harmonious personal identity, secured by stability and permanence in God 
(the Hebrew verb root אמן means “sustained...; reliable, firm, faithful; to last, 
to stay, to endure” (Fohrer  16f.), and at the same time it impressively reveals 
the peaceful tranquillitas animi of the one who blesses everything managed 
by divine providence with a “So be it”.
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